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Abstract
Autoepistemic logic is an important formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning originally intended to model an ideal rational agent 
reflecting upon his own beliefs. Fuzzy autoepistemic logic is a generalization of autoepistemic logic that allows to represent an 
agent’s rational beliefs on gradable propositions. It has recently been shown that, in the same way as autoepistemic logic generalizes 
answer set programming, fuzzy autoepistemic logic generalizes fuzzy answer set programming as well. Besides being related to 
answer set programming, autoepistemic logic is also closely related to several modal logics. To investigate whether a similar 
relationship holds in a fuzzy logical setting, we firstly generalize the main modal logics for belief to the setting of finitely-valued 
Łukasiewicz logic with truth constants Łc
k
, and secondly we relate them with fuzzy autoepistemic logics. Moreover, we show that 
the problem of satisfiability checking in these logics is NP-complete. Finally, we generalize Levesque’s results on stable expansions, 
belief sets, and “only knowing” operators to our setting, and provide a complete axiomatization for a logic of “only knowing” in 
the Łc
k
framework.
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Since its introduction in the 1980s, autoepistemic logic [1–3] has been one of the main formalisms for nonmono-
tonic reasoning. It extends propositional logic by offering the ability to reason about an agent’s (lack of) beliefs. In 
autoepistemic logic, beliefs are represented by sets of sentences in a propositional language augmented by a modal 
operator B. If ϕ is a formula, then Bϕ, which has to be interpreted as “ϕ is believed”, is a formula as well. Note 
that in this language nested modal operators are allowed; it is possible to have beliefs about beliefs. Autoepistemic 
logic is nonmonotonic because conclusions made on the basis of incomplete information can be revised when new 
information becomes available. For instance, in autoepistemic logic we can express that “If I do not believe p, then 
q is true.” If p cannot be inferred, q can be derived, but when p is added to the set of premises, q can no longer be 
derived. Originally, autoepistemic logic was intended to model the beliefs of an ideal rational agent [1], by means of 
the so-called stable expansions. These are the deductively closed sets of beliefs that an ideal rational agent can have 
based on a particular set of premises A. Formally, given a set of autoepistemic formulas A, a set of autoepistemic 
formulas EA is a stable expansion of A if
EA =
{
ϕ |A∪ {Bψ |ψ ∈EA} ∪ {¬Bψ |ψ /∈EA}  ϕ
}
,
where  denotes derivability in classical propositional logic, and each formula Bϕ is considered as a new propositional 
variable (e.g. B(a ∧ Bb) is a variable but a ∧ Bb is the conjunction of the variables a and Bb). Using the definition 
of a stable expansion, it is easy to see that autoepistemic logic is nonmonotonic. Indeed, consider a set of premises 
A = {¬Bp → q} and suppose there exists a stable expansion EA. Since there is no reason to have p ∈ EA, it follows 
that ¬Bp ∈ EA and thus q ∈ EA. If p is added to the premises: A′ = {¬Bp → q, p}, then Bp ∈ EA′ for a stable 
expansion EA′ and thus q /∈EA′ .
In [4], a corresponding possible-world-like semantics is proposed. In particular, if we consider a set of propositional 
variables V , truth values are defined relatively to a pair (I, S) where S is a subset of classical interpretations in  = 2V , 
representing the agent’s beliefs (i.e. the agent’s epistemic state), and I ∈  is a particular interpretation intuitively 
corresponding to the “actual world”. Note that, in contrast to the approach from [5], the approach from [4] does not 
require that I ∈ S, in which case S models belief rather than knowledge. In fact, the pair (I, S) can be regarded as a 
pointed S5 Kripke model (with accessibility relation R = S × S) in case I ∈ S, or as a pointed KD45 Kripke model 
in case I /∈ S. It is then shown that these semantics are in one-to-one correspondence with the stable expansions as 
originally defined in [1].
In [6], Levesque’s logic of only knowing is introduced as an extension of autoepistemic logic to enable the modeling 
of expressions of the form “ϕ is all that is believed”, i.e. there are no other relevant beliefs, but ϕ. To this end, the 
language is expanded with a second modal operator O. For every formula ϕ, Oϕ reads “ϕ is all that is believed” or 
“only ϕ is believed”. In [6] it is then shown that stable expansions correspond to a particular type of valid sentences in 
this logic. Finally, a sound and complete axiomatization based on classical K45 modal logic is provided by pointing 
out that Oϕ can be rewritten as Bϕ ∧ N¬ϕ where the modal operators N and B are both K45 operators. In particular, 
Bϕ corresponds to “ϕ is believed” and N¬ϕ to “at most ¬ϕ is believed to be false”. Hence Oϕ corresponds to “at 
least and at most ϕ is believed”, i.e. “exactly ϕ is believed”.
Logic programming had a significant impact on the development of some nonmonotonic logics and vice-versa 
(e.g. [7]). In particular, Gelfond and Lifschitz [8] showed that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the answer 
sets of an answer set program and the stable expansions of a corresponding autoepistemic theory. Hence, answer sets 
also correspond to valid sentences in logic of only knowing. Recently, a fuzzy generalization of autoepistemic logic 
has been defined in [9]. In the same paper, it has also been shown that the important relation between autoepistemic 
logic and answer set programming is preserved: the answer sets of a fuzzy answer set program (e.g. [10]) can be 
equivalently determined by computing the stable fuzzy expansions of a corresponding set of fuzzy autoepistemic 
formulas.
In this paper, in order to model the notion of belief on fuzzy propositions, we introduce generalizations of the main 
classical propositional modal logics of belief (K45, KD45, S5) based on finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic with truth 
constants. Throughout this paper, we will denote the k + 1 valued Łukasiewicz logic with truth constants as Łck . For 
technical reasons we only consider truth degrees belonging to a finite scale Sk = {0, 1k , . . . , k−1k , 1}. Indeed, this as-
sumption ensures that two key properties are satisfied: Łc is complete for deductions from an arbitrary set of premises, k
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and the Baaz–Monteiro projection operator  is definable in Łck . Moreover, note that all operations that are defin-
able in (k + 1)-valued Gödel logic are definable in (k + 1)-valued Łukasiewicz logic as well. Hence the choice for 
Łukasiewicz logic ensures some level of generality. Another possibility would be to consider BL [11], extended with 
the Baaz–Monteiro projection, but then the connectives lack a clear numerical interpretation.
Then, we show how fuzzy autoepistemic logic can also be characterized in terms of a possible worlds seman-
tics intimately related to the Kripke models underlying the semantics of the Łck-variants of K45, KD45, and S5. 
We will show NP-completeness for two variants of the satisfiability problem. Finally, we also consider the ex-
tension of many-valued autoepistemic logic with an “only knowing” operator O and show that the relationship 
between stable expansions, belief sets and “only knowing” operators [6] naturally extends to our framework. As 
in the classical case we show that formulas of the form Oϕ can be rewritten as Bϕ ∧ N¬ϕ where B and N are 
many-valued K45 modalities. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this finitely-valued Łukasiewicz 
logic of only knowing and show that stable fuzzy expansions correspond to valid sentences in this logic. In par-
ticular this implies that the answer sets of a fuzzy answer set program correspond to valid sentences in this 
logic.
A summarizing diagram of embeddings and generalizations with references can be found in Fig. 1.
This paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, in Section 2, we recall some necessary preliminar-
ies on the (k + 1)-valued Łukasiewicz logic with truth constants Łck , and some results on the minimal modal logic 
over Łck . In Section 3, we define proper generalizations of the classical modal systems K45, KD45 and S5 and prove 
soundness and completeness with respect to appropriate Kripke-style semantics. In the same section, we also in-
troduce a (possibly exponential) reduction for satisfiability from fuzzy to classical modal logics. In Section 4, we 
deal with the complexity of these logics and prove NP-completeness for two variants of the satisfiability problem. 
Then, in Section 5, we consider possible world semantics for the fuzzy autoepistemic logic of [9] and provide a 
characterization of stable fuzzy expansions both in terms of many-valued K45 belief sets, and in terms of proper 
generalizations of stable sets. In Section 6, we generalize the propositional fragment of Levesque’s “only know-
ing” logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization, and we characterize stable fuzzy expansions in terms 
of the belief sets involving the “only knowing” operator O. We conclude with related works and some final re-
marks.
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2.1. Finitely valued Łukasiewicz logic with truth constants
Let L be the propositional language whose formulas are built from a countable set of propositional variables V , the 
binary connective → (implication), and truth constants c for each c ∈ Sk = {0, 1k , . . . , k−1k , 1} (for some fixed k ∈N). 
Further connectives are defined as follows:
¬φ = φ → 0 φ ∧ψ = φ ⊗ (φ →ψ)
φ ⊗ψ = ¬(φ → ¬ψ) φ ⊕ψ = ¬(¬φ ⊗ ¬ψ)
φ ∨ψ = ((φ →ψ)→ψ) φ ↔ψ = (φ →ψ)⊗ (ψ → φ)
with φ and ψ arbitrary formulas. A propositional evaluation is a mapping e : V → Sk that extends to formulas in the 
following manner. If φ and ψ are formulas and c is an element in Sk , then
e(φ →ψ)= e(φ)⇒ e(ψ) and e(c)= c,
where x ⇒ y = min(1, 1 − x + y) for x, y ∈ Sk . Note that (x ⇒ y) = 1 iff x ≤ y. The set of all such evaluations will 
be denoted by k . Notice that, in particular, for every formula φ and ψ and for every e ∈k , we have
e(¬φ) = 1 − e(φ) e(φ ∧ψ) = min(e(φ), e(ψ))
e(φ ⊗ψ) = max(e(φ)+ e(ψ)− 1,0) e(φ ⊕ψ) = min(1, e(φ)+ e(ψ))
e(φ ∨ψ) = max(e(φ), e(ψ)) e(φ ↔ψ) = 1 − |(e(φ)− e(ψ)|
A formula φ is said to be satisfiable if there exists an e ∈ k such that e(φ) = 1. In such a case we say that e is a 
model of φ and e is a model of a set of formulas T if e is a model of every formula in T . A tautology is a formula φ
such that e(φ) = 1 for each e ∈k . A formula φ is a semantic consequence of a set of formulas , written as  | φ, 
if it holds that every model of  is also a model of φ.
This logic based on the language L, which we will denote by Łck , has a sound and a strongly complete axiomatiza-
tion, see e.g. [12] for details. In particular, the axioms of Łck are
(Ł1) ϕ → (ψ → ϕ),
(Ł2) (ϕ →ψ) → ((ψ → χ) → (ϕ → χ)),
(Ł3) ((ϕ → 0) → (ψ → 0)) → (ψ → ϕ),
(Ł4) ((ϕ →ψ) →ψ) → ((ψ → ϕ) → ϕ),
(Ł5) (k + 1)ϕ ↔ kϕ,
(Ł6) (nϕn−1)k+1 ↔ (k + 1)ϕn for each natural number n ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1} that does not divide k,
(Q1) (c1 → c2) ↔ min{1,1 − c1 + c2},
and the only deduction rule is modus ponens (from φ and φ → ψ infer ψ ). Axioms (Ł1)–(Ł4) form an alternative 
axiomatization for Łukasiewicz logic, and in axioms (Ł5) and (Ł6), nϕ is an abbreviation for ϕ ⊕ . . . ⊕ ϕ (with n
repetitions of ϕ) and ϕn for ϕ ⊗ . . .⊗ ϕ (n repetitions of ϕ). From axiom (Q1) – the so called bookkeeping axiom – 
we derive the canonical interpretation for truth constants.
Let  denote the deducibility relation in Łck . Then, as usual, a formula ψ can be derived from a set of formulas T , 
written T ψ , if there exists a finite sequence of formulas whose last member is ψ and for which every element in the 
sequence is either (i) an instantation of an axiom in Łck , (ii) an element in T , or (iii) a formula derived from previous 
elements in the sequence by modus ponens. The following result, which is considered to be folklore of the field, can 
be easily proved as a direct consequence of [13] and [14, Corollary 3.4].
Theorem 1 (Strong completeness). Let T ∪ {ψ} be an arbitrary set of formulas of Łck . Then T ψ iff T |ψ .
A formula ψ that can be proven from the axioms of Łck and modus ponens is called a theorem; in this case we will 
write ψ .
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k + 1 truth values this formula is Boolean. Indeed, it is easy to check that for every e ∈k ,
e(φ)=
{
1 if e(φ)= 1
0 if e(φ) < 1
Note that  corresponds to the well-known Baaz–Monteiro projection operator which was introduced independently 
by Monteiro [15] and Baaz [16]. In semantical terms, a many-valued formula φ is transformed to a Boolean one φ
which is false whenever φ is not fully true. In other words, if we consider a formula as a fuzzy set of evaluations 
vφ(e) = e(φ), then the  operator takes only the core of this fuzzy set.
2.2. Minimal modal logic over Łck
The minimal modal language LB we will consider in the paper is obtained by adding the modal operator B denoting 
“belief” to the language L. Our approach is based on previous theoretical work [17] on fuzzy modal logics where the 
truth values are taken from a finite residuated lattice. In [17], among other logics, the authors introduce the minimal 
modal logic over Łck .
A semantics for LB can be defined w.r.t. Kripke models of the form M = (W, e, R) where W is a countable set of 
possible worlds, e : W × V → Sk is a mapping giving an evaluation of variables e(w, ·) : V → Sk for each possible 
world w ∈ W , and R ⊆ W × W is a (two-valued) accessibility relation on possible worlds. Given a Kripke model 
M = (W, e, R) and a world w ∈W , the truth value of a formula φ in LB is inductively defined as follows:
• If φ is a propositional variable p, then ‖φ‖M,w = e(w, p)
• If φ is a truth constant c, then ‖φ‖M,w = c
• If φ = Bψ , then ‖φ‖M,w = infw′:(w,w′)∈R ‖ψ‖M,w′
• If φ =ψ → γ , then ‖φ‖M,w = (‖ψ‖M,w ⇒ ‖γ ‖M,w)
The definition of ‖Bψ‖M,w intuitively expresses that the belief degree of ψ in a world w ∈ W coincides with the 
minimum truth degree that ψ takes in every world which is accessible from w. A formula φ is said to be satisfiable
if there exists a Kripke model M = (W, e, R) and a w ∈ W such that ‖φ‖M,w = 1. In such a case we say that M is a 
model of φ. A set of formulas T is satisfied by a Kripke model M if every formula in T is satisfied by M . It is called 
a tautology if for each Kripke model M = (W, e, R) and for each w ∈ W we have ‖φ‖M,w = 1. A formula φ is a 
semantic consequence of a set of formulas , written as  |B φ, if ‖ψ‖M,w = 1 for all ψ ∈ , for all Kripke models 
M = (W, e, R) and for all w ∈W implies ‖φ‖M,w = 1 for all Kripke models M = (W, e, R) and for all w ∈W .
Now, let us consider the logic BŁck whose axioms are:
(Łck) axioms of Łck ,
(B2) (Bϕ ∧ Bψ) → B(ϕ ∧ψ),
(B3) B(c → ϕ) ↔ (c → Bϕ), for each c ∈ Sk ,
(B4) (Bϕ ⊕ Bϕ) ↔ B(ϕ ⊕ ϕ),
(K) B(φ →ψ) → (Bφ → Bψ),
and whose rules are modus ponens (from φ and φ →ψ infer ψ ) and necessitation for B (if φ is a theorem then Bφ is 
a theorem as well).
Axioms (B2) and (K) are typical axioms in normal modal logics. Axioms (B3) and (B4) basically reflect the seman-
tics of the operator B (an infimum over worlds) on constants and on the Łukasiewicz strong disjunction. (B3) could be 
roughly read as stipulating that one believes that the truth value of φ is at least c iff one believes at least to the degree 
c that φ is true. In other words, this axiom tells us how graded belief has to be interpreted. (B4) can be understood as 
expressing that the operator B is commuting with any increasing unary connective of the logic. Note that if we define 
•ϕ := ϕ ⊕ ϕ, then axiom (B4) could be simply expressed as B • ϕ ↔ •Bϕ; and the same holds for •′ϕ := ϕ ⊗ ϕ. The 
axiom c ↔ Bc is again a graded generalization of a standard KD45 axiom, which expresses that one believes tautolo-
gies B and does not believe falsehoods ¬B⊥. Our generalization expresses that the truth constant c is believed to 
degree c.
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that will be denoted M.
3. Fuzzy modal logics of belief: extensions of BŁck
When defining logics of belief, it is common to require a number of properties of the modal operator B which 
do not follow from the axioms of BŁck . For instance, it is common to presume that the agent has both positive and 
negative introspective capabilities. This is captured in the classical case by the well-known axioms (4) and (5). Belief 
consistency is captured by axiom (D). Finally, when dealing with knowledge instead of beliefs modal axiom (T) can 
be added. In this paper, we will consider extensions of BŁck which are obtained by adding some or all of these classical 
axioms.
(D) ¬B¬1
(4) Bφ → BBφ
(5) ¬Bφ → B¬Bφ
(T) Bφ → φ
As in the classical case [18,19], we consider the following extensions of BŁck :
• K45(Łck): BŁck plus axioms (4) and (5),• KD45(Łck): BŁck plus axioms (D), (4) and (5),• S5(Łck): BŁck plus axioms (T), (4) and (5).
We will denote by L the notion of proof for any of the logics L ∈ {K45(Łck), KD45(Łck), S5(Łck)}. The next task is 
to prove completeness of these logics4 with respect to corresponding classes of many-valued Kripke models.
As was done for (fuzzy) autoepistemic logic [1,9], we will sometimes consider a formula φ in LB as a B-free 
formula φ∗ by treating subformulas of the form Bψ as new propositional variables. For instance, B(a ∧ Bb) is then 
seen as a fresh variable pB(a∧Bb) and has in principle no connection to Bb. Formally, consider the propositional 
language L∗ built from variables V ∗ = V ∪ {pBφ | φ ∈ LB}, truth constants in Sk and the connective →. We define 
the translation function (·)∗ from LB to L∗ in the following manner: p∗ = p, c∗ = c, (φ → ψ)∗ = φ∗ → ψ∗ and 
(Bφ)∗ = pBφ (with pBφ a new variable). For a set of formulas A, we define A∗ = {ψ∗ | ψ ∈ A}. The set of all 
propositional evaluations e : V ∗ → Sk will be denoted by ∗k .
As a first step, we show a relation between proving a formula ψ in one of the modal extensions of BŁck and proving 
the corresponding B-free formula ψ∗ ∈ L∗ from a suitable theory in the propositional logic Łck (but over the set of 
variables V ∗).
Lemma 1. Let L be any of the logics K45(Łck), KD45(Łck), S5(Łck). Suppose T ∪ {ψ} is a set of formulas from LB and 
let 
L = {φ∗ |L φ}. Then it holds that T L ψ iff T ∗ ∪
L ψ∗.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The proof of Lemma 1 is based on the fact that a proof in L can be translated into a proof in Łck and vice versa. The 
set 
L represents the set of (·)∗-translations of modal theorems of L. As the following example illustrates this set is 
needed to convert a proof in L to a proof in Łck .
Example 1. Consider T = {Ba}. Then T L B(b → a) where b is an arbitrary variable. Indeed, by axiom (Ł1) it 
follows that L a → (b → a) and thus by necessitation it follows that L B(a → (b → a)). By axiom (K) we have
L B(a → (b → a))→ (Ba → B(b → a)),
4 We restrict ourselves to the logics K45(Łc
k
), KD45(Łc
k
) and S5(Łc
k
), but completeness results could be obtained in a similar way for any of the 
logics resulting from other combinations of the above axioms.
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then implies T L B(b → a).
On the other hand, if we consider T ∗ = {pBa}, then we have T ∗ ∪ 
L  pB(b→a). Indeed, since L Ba →
B(b → a), it follows that
pBa → pB(b→a) = (Ba → B(b → a))∗ ∈
L
and by modus ponens and pBa ∈ T ∗ we derive that T ∗ ∪
L  pB(b→a).
We now define the canonical Kripke model for a given fuzzy modal logic L. We will use this Kripke model to show 
completeness in Theorem 2. The following definition applies to any logic L obtained by adding to the axioms of BŁck
combinations of the axioms (D), (4), (5) and (T) and hence in particular for L ∈ {K45(Łck), KD45(Łck), S5(Łck)}. The 
L-canonical Kripke model is defined as the Kripke model MLcan = (WLcan, eLcan, RLcan), where
• WLcan = {w ∈∗k | ∀φ ∈
L :w(φ) = 1} with 
L = {φ∗ | L φ},
• RLcan = {(w1, w2) ∈ ∗k ×∗k | ∀φ ∈ LB : if w1((Bφ)∗) = 1, then w2(φ∗) = 1},
• eLcan(w, p) =w(p) for each variable p.
We now introduce some subclasses of the class M of Kripke models (W, e, R) with two-valued accessibility rela-
tions, depending on which properties R satisfies. Recall that a relation R :X ×X → {0, 1}5 is
– Euclidean if R(x, y) =R(x, z) = 1 implies R(y, z) = 1.
– serial if for every x ∈X there exists y ∈X such that R(x, y) = 1.
– transitive if R(x, y) =R(y, z) = 1 implies R(x, z) = 1.
– reflexive if R(x, x) = 1 for all x ∈X.
– symmetric if R(x, y) =R(y, x) for all x, y ∈X.
We then define the following subclasses of M.
• Met: class of Kripke models (W, e, R) with R Euclidean and transitive.
• Mest: class of Kripke models (W, e, R) with R Euclidean, serial and transitive.
• Mrsyt: class of Kripke models (W, e, R) with R reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
In order to prove the main result of this section, i.e. Theorem 2, we first need first to prove the following prelim-
inary lemma. This lemma shows the relation between evaluations of formulas in the L-canonical Kripke model, and 
evaluations of the corresponding B-free formulas in Łck .
Lemma 2. (Truth-lemma) Suppose φ is a formula in LB and L ∈ {K45(Łck), KD45(Łck), S5(Łck)} with MLcan its canon-
ical Kripke model. Then it holds that v(φ∗) = ‖φ‖MLcan,v , for every v ∈WLcan.
Proof. By using the monotonicity for B and the distributivity of ∨ and ∧, the claim follows by an easy adaptation 
from Lemma 4.20 in [17]. 
The following proposition collects basic properties of canonical Kripke models.
Proposition 1. Let L ∈ {K45(Łck), KD45(Łck), S5(Łck)}, then the following conditions hold
1. If L contains axiom (T) then RLcan is reflexive.
2. If L contains axiom (4) then RLcan is transitive.
5 Note that a relation R ⊆ X × X can be seen as a mapping R : X × X → {0, 1} where R(x, y) = 1 iff (x, y) ∈ R. In this text will use both 
notations to denote two-valued relations.
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4. If L contains axiom (D) then RLcan is serial.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Using Proposition 1, we can now show the following theorem.
Theorem 2. K45(Łck), KD45(Ł
c
k) and S5(Ł
c
k) are sound and complete w.r.t. the classes Met, Mest and Mrsyt respec-
tively.
Proof. Soundness is straightforward. We can show the completeness by proving that if there is a formula φ such 
that L φ with L ∈ {K45(Łck), KD45(Łck), S5(Łck)}, then there must exist a Kripke model M = (W, e, R) in the corre-
sponding subclass of Kripke models and a w ∈W such that ‖φ‖M,w < 1. We show that the L-canonical Kripke model 
meets this condition. The fact that each of these canonical Kripke models belongs to the correct subclass of M follows 
from Proposition 1 and from the fact that all reflexive and Euclidean relations are symmetric. By Lemma 1 it follows, 
independent of the choice of L, that 
L  φ∗ and by the strong completeness of Łck it then follows that 
L  φ∗, i.e. 
there exists a v ∈WLcan such that v(φ∗) < 1. By Lemma 2 we obtain that ‖φ‖Mcan,v < 1. 
As in the classical case (see e.g. [20]), the logics K45(Łck), KD45(Łck) and S5(Łck) admit simpler semantics while 
preserving soundness and completeness. Consider the following classes of Kripke models where W×E is the mapping 
W ×W → {0, 1} such that (W ×E)(w, v) = 1 if (w, v) ∈W ×E, i.e. v ∈E, and (W ×E)(w, v) = 0 otherwise.
• Mset : the subclass of Kripke models M = (W, e, R) with R =W ×E for some fixed E ⊆W
• Msest: the subclass of Kripke models M = (W, e, R) with R =W ×E for some fixed and nonempty E ⊆W
• Msrsyt: the subclass of Kripke models M = (W, e, R) with R =W ×W
Notice that Mset, Msest and Msrsyt are subclasses of resp. Met, Mest and Mrsyt.
Proposition 2. K45(Łck), KD45(Ł
c
k) and S5(Ł
c
k) are sound and complete w.r.t. the classes Mset, Msest and Msrsyt respec-
tively.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Finally, let us show that one can reduce reasoning in any of our many-valued modal logics to reasoning in classical 
modal logics. We show it for the basic modal logic BŁck .
For each formula φ ∈ LB and truth value r ∈ Sk consider the formula φr ∈ LB defined as (φ ↔ r). This formula 
is a Boolean formula and for each Kripke model M = (W, e, R) in M and each w ∈ W we have ‖φr‖M,w = 1 iff 
‖φ‖M,w = r . Define L′B ⊆ LB as the set of formulas constructed from the set of formulas {(p ↔ r) | p ∈ V, r ∈ Sk}:
• (p ↔ r) ∈ L′B for every p ∈ V and r ∈ Sk .• (φ →ψ) ∈ L′B if φ, ψ ∈ L′B .• Bφ ∈ L′B if φ ∈ L′B .
In the following lemma we will show that for each formula (φ ↔ r), for which we will use the short notation φr , 
there exists some (φr)′ ∈ L′B such that the truth values remain the same.
Lemma 3. For any formula φ ∈ LB and truth value r ∈ Sk , there exists a formula (φr)′ ∈ L′B such that for each Kripke 
model M = (W, e, R) ∈M and each world w ∈W it holds that
‖φr‖M,w = ‖(φr)′‖M,w.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
JID:FSS AID:6759 /FLA [m3SC+; v1.204; Prn:31/03/2015; 9:42] P.9 (1-26)
M. Blondeel et al. / Fuzzy Sets and Systems ••• (••••) •••–••• 9Example 2. Consider S2 = {0, 12 , 1}, φ = a → b, ψ = Ba and r = 12 . Then e.g.
(φr)
′ = (a 1
2
∧ b0)∨ (a1 ∧ b 1
2
)
and
(ψr)
′ = B(a 1
2
∨ a1)∧ ¬B(a1).
Using Lemma 3 we then have the following reduction from BŁck to classical modal logic.
Proposition 3. For each formula φ ∈ LB and r ∈ Sk there exists some formula ψ ∈ L′B , i.e. ψ is a Boolean formula, 
such that
‖φ‖M,w = r iff ‖ψ‖M,w = 1
for every Kripke model M = (W, e, R) ∈M and each world w ∈W .
4. Complexity of satisfiability problems
This section is concerned with the complexity of two satisfiability problems for KD45(Łck). The results we will 
obtain also hold for K45(Łck) and S5(Ł
c
k) because the proofs we will show can easily be adapted to these cases.
Let us define the following variants of the classical SAT-problem:
• 1-SAT: Given a formula φ ∈ LB, does there exist an M = (W, e, R) ∈Msest and a w ∈W such that ‖φ‖M,w = 1?
• pos-SAT: Given a formula φ ∈ LB, does there exist an M = (W, e, R) ∈Msest and a w ∈W such that ‖φ‖M,w > 0?
We will show that these problems are NP-complete which is the same complexity class as the corresponding decision 
problem for classical KD45 (see [20] for more details on the complexity of classical modal logics).
Note that 1-SAT and pos-SAT can be polynomially reduced to each other. Indeed, a formula φ is “pos-SAT” 
if ¬(¬φ) is “1-SAT” and a formula φ is “1-SAT” if φ is “pos-SAT”. Hence it is sufficient to show the NP-
completeness of 1-SAT.
For any formula φ ∈ LB, we denote by #φ its length:
– #c = 1 for each c ∈ Sk and #p = 1 for every p ∈ V .
– #(φ →ψ) = 1 + #φ + #ψ and similar for the other connectives.
– #(Bφ) = 1 + #φ.
For a formula φ ∈ LB, we denote by d(φ) its depth which is defined as usual by counting the nested occurrences 
of the modality B.
Example 3. Consider the formula φ = Ba ⊕ ¬b with a and b variables. Then
#(Ba ⊕ ¬b)= 1 + #(Ba)+ #(¬b)= 1 + 1 + #(a)+ 1 + #(b)= 5.
For ϕ and ψ propositional (i.e. B-free) formulas, we have: d(ϕ) = d(ψ) = 0, d(B(ϕ)) = d(B(ϕ ⊕ ψ)) = d(ϕ ⊕
B(ψ)) = 1, d(B(ϕ ⊕B(ψ))) = 2 and so forth.
Lemma 4. Let φ be a formula in LB. Then for every model M = (W, e, R) ∈Msest, and for every w ∈ W , there exists 
a finite model M ′ = (W ′, e′, R′) ∈Msest and a world w′ ∈W ′ such that |W ′| ≤ #φ and ‖φ‖M,w = ‖φ‖M ′,w′ .
Proof. Consider a Kripke model M = (W, e, R) with R = W × E (∅ = E ⊆ W ) and w ∈ W . The aim is to find a 
finite set W ′, a non-empty subset E′ ⊆W ′, a mapping e′ :W ′ ×V → Sk and some w′ ∈W ′ for which the claim holds.
Trivially, if φ is B-free, take W ′ = E′ = {w}, R′ = W ′ × E′, w′ = w, and take e′ be defined by restricting e :
W × V → Sk to W ′ × V .
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ψ1j is B-free. Since the set of truth-values Sk is finite, for each ψ
1
j there exists a world w
1
j such that
‖Bψ1j ‖M,w = ‖ψ1j ‖M,w1j =w
1
j (ψ
1
j ).
Letting r1j = ‖Bψ1j ‖M,w , replace each subformula Bψ1j by the corresponding truth constant r1j and, if d = d(φ) > 1, 
repeat the process for all levels 2, . . . , d . Let E′ = {wlj | 1 ≤ l ≤ d, 1 ≤ j ≤ il}, W ′ = {w} ∪ E′, w′ = w and let 
e′ be defined by restricting e : W × V → Sk to W ′ × V . Then, by construction, ‖φ‖M,w = ‖φ‖M ′,w′ . Moreover, 
|W ′| = 1 +∑dl=1 il ≤ #φ. 
Observe that the proof of Lemma 4 uses a procedure which, given a formula φ ∈ LB , a Kripke model M =
(W, e, R) and a w ∈ W , outputs a B-free formula φM such that M | φ if and only if φM is 1-satisfiable in Łck . In 
particular, φM is obtained by substituting each of the subformulas of the form Bψ in φ by the truth-constant r with 
r = ‖Bψ‖M,w .
Theorem 3. The problems 1-SAT and pos-SAT for KD45(Łck) are NP-complete.
Proof. Since each formula of Łukasiewicz logic is in particular a formula of LB , and since 1-SAT (as well as pos-SAT) 
for Łck is NP-complete, the NP-hardness of our problem follows. In order to prove NP-membership, recall that from 
Lemma 4 a formula φ is 1-SAT in a model M iff φ is 1-SAT in a finite model M ′ whose cardinality is polynomial 
in the length of φ. Let us guess the model M ′ = (W ′, e′, R′) and let us also guess w′ ∈ W ′. Since |W ′| ≤ #φ, these 
guesses are polynomial in #φ. Let φM ′ be the formula of Łck obtained from M ′, w′ and φ applying the procedure 
described above. Notice that #φM ′ is polynomial in #φ. Moreover, since |W ′| ≤ #φ the formula φM ′ is obtained in a 
number of steps which is polynomial in #φ. From [21] it follows that checking if φM ′ is 1-SAT (pos-SAT) in Łck is in 
NP, and hence the NP-membership follows. 
Remark 1. For each r ∈ Sk , let us define the decision problem r-SAT in the following way:
“Given a formula φ, does there exist an M = (W, e, R) ∈Msest and a w ∈W such that ‖φ‖M,w = r?”
It turns out that, for every r ∈ Sk , r-SAT is NP-complete as well. Indeed, this problem is equivalent to 1-SAT for the 
formula (φ ↔ r) which is polynomial in φ. Hence NP-membership follows. NP-hardness follows from the fact that 
for each r > 0, 1-SAT can be reduced to r-SAT since a formula ‖φ‖M,w = 1 iff ‖φ ⊗ r‖M,w = r . For r = 0, we can 
reduce 1-SAT as follows: ‖φ‖M,w = 1 iff ‖¬φ‖M,w = 0.
Note that in [22], it was shown that 1-SAT and pos-SAT for the minimal modal logic over Łk with Sk-valued 
accessibility relations are PSPACE-complete.
5. Relating fuzzy modal logic and fuzzy autoepistemic logic
The aim of Moore’s autoepistemic logic [1] is to characterize the set of beliefs of a rational agent with introspection 
capabilities by means of a set of simple properties it must fulfill. The language of fuzzy autoepistemic logic is the same 
as LB, the modal logic with the belief operator B, so Bϕ is still read as “the agent believes ϕ”. The basic construct 
is concerned with the notion of a stable expansion E of a set of initial beliefs A, briefly introduced in Section 1. It 
can be seen as the closed set of beliefs of an ideal rational agent reflecting on his own beliefs. In this section we 
first consider a many-valued generalization of the notion of stable expansions from [9]. Then we introduce a possible 
world semantics for the resulting many-valued stable expansions and we show their relation to the fuzzy modal logics 
studied in Section 3. Finally we establish a link to a graded generalization of Stalnaker’s notion of stable belief sets.
5.1. Stable fuzzy expansions
The following semantic definition of stable fuzzy expansions has been introduced in [9].
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following fixpoint condition:
EA(φ) = min
{
v(φ∗) | v ∈∗k, v model of A∗ ∪ {(Bψ)∗ ↔EA(ψ) |ψ ∈ LB}
}
.
Recall that EA(ψ) denotes the truth constant corresponding to the membership value of ψ in EA and that, for 
a formula φ ∈ LB , φ∗ is the corresponding B-free formula, see Section 3. Using the strong completeness of Łck , in 
particular the fact that for any set of Łck formulas T ∪ {φ} one has
min{v(φ) | v(ψ)= 1 for all ψ ∈ T } = max{r ∈ Sk | T  r → φ},
and thus one can rewrite the above semantic definition of stable fuzzy expansion of A as a fuzzy set of formulas EA
satisfying the following syntactic fixpoint condition:
EA(φ) = max
{
r ∈ Sk |A∗ ∪ {(Bψ)∗ ↔EA(ψ) |ψ ∈ LB}  r → φ∗
}
.
Still, this condition can be equivalently rewritten as the following two joint conditions:
EA =
{
φ ∈ LB |A∗ ∪ {(Bψ)∗ ↔EA(ψ) |ψ ∈ LB}  φ∗
}
, and
EA(φ)= max{r ∈ Sk | r → φ ∈EA}.
Notice that φ ∈EA if and only if EA(φ) = 1. In other words, EA is the core of the fuzzy set EA.
5.2. Possible world semantics for stable fuzzy expansions
Generalizing Moore’s result [4], it is shown in [9] that stable fuzzy expansions can also be characterized by a fuzzy 
Kripke-style possible world semantics. In particular, a fuzzy autoepistemic structure is a pair (w, S) with w ∈k and 
S ⊆ k . Informally, w represents the actual world which is used to evaluate B-free formulas and S represents all 
worlds considered possible (i.e. epistemic states) and is used to evaluate formulas of the form Bψ . The class of such 
structures will be denoted by Mae. The degree of truth of an LB-formula φ relative to a fuzzy autoepistemic structure 
(w, S) is inductively defined as follows:
– If φ is a propositional formula from L, then ‖φ‖(w,S) =w(φ).
– If φ is a truth constant c, then ‖φ‖(w,S) = c.
– If φ = Bψ , then ‖Bψ‖(w,S) = inf{‖ψ‖(v,S) | v ∈ S}.
– If φ =ψ → γ , ‖φ‖(w,S) = (‖ψ‖(w,S) ⇒ ‖γ ‖(w,S)).
Intuitively, one can think of S as a set of possible worlds. Hence, the truth degree of Bϕ in S is equal to the minimal 
truth degree to which ϕ is considered to be true in all possible worlds. In other words, we can interpret the truth value 
of Bϕ as the minimal truth value for ϕ which is supported by the agent’s epistemic state.
Since the truth evaluation of formulas of the form Bϕ in a structure (w, S) does not depend on the actual world w, 
we will also write ‖Bϕ‖S to denote ‖Bϕ‖(w,S). Note that, if S = ∅, then ‖Bϕ‖S = 1. Also note that, conversely, the 
interpretation w in (w, S) is needed to evaluate non-modal formulas.
We consider the following subclasses of fuzzy autoepistemic structures of Mae:
• the class Maee , where only pairs (w, S) with S non-empty are considered,
• the class Maein ⊆Maee , where only pairs (w, S) with w ∈ S are considered.
It can be shown that K45(Łck), KD45(Ł
c
k) and S5(Ł
c
k) are still sound and complete with respect to the classes Mae, 
M
ae
e and Maein respectively.
Theorem 4. K45(Łc), KD45(Łc) and S5(Łc) are sound and complete w.r.t. to Mae, Maee and Maein , respectively.k k k
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List of languages, logics and semantics used in this paper.
Syntax Logic Semantics
Finitely valued Łukasiewicz 
logic with truth constants over 
variables V
L Łc
k
k
Minimal modal logic over Łc
k
with crisp accessibility relations 
over variables V
LB BŁck M
K45 over Łc
k
LB K45(Łck) Met
LB K45(Łck) Mset
LB K45(Łck) Mae
KD45 over Łc
k
LB KD45(Łck) Mest
LB KD45(Łck) Msest
LB KD45(Łck) Maee
S5 over Łc
k
LB S5(Łck) Mrsyt
LB S5(Łck) Msrsyt
LB S5(Łck) Maein
“Only knowing” over Łc
k
LO O(Łck) Mae
Proof. We only show the case of KD45(Łck). The other cases are obtained by slight adaptations of the proof. By 
Proposition 2 it is sufficient to show that Msest and Maee have the same tautologies.
First suppose there exists an M = (W, e, R) ∈ Msest (i.e. R = W × E and ∅ = E ⊆ W ) and w ∈ W such that 
‖φ‖M,w < 1. We show that for (e(w, ·), S) ∈Maee , where S = {e(w′, ·) | w′ ∈ E}, we have ‖φ‖(e(w,·),S) < 1. We will 
do this by showing that ‖φ‖M,w = ‖φ‖(e(w,·),S). To obtain this result we will show by structural induction that for 
each formula γ and for each z ∈ W we have ‖γ ‖M,z = ‖γ ‖(e(z,·),S). The only notable case is γ = Bα for which it 
holds that ‖α‖M,v = ‖α‖(e(v,·),S) for all v ∈W (induction hypothesis). Now consider z ∈W , we show that ‖Bα‖M,z =
‖Bα‖(e(z,·),S).
‖Bα‖M,z = inf{‖α‖M,v |R(z, v)= 1} = inf{‖α‖M,v | v ∈E}
= inf{‖α‖(e(v,·),S) | v ∈E} = inf{‖α‖(v′,S) | v′ ∈ S}
= ‖Bα‖(e(z,·),S)
where we use the fact that R =W ×E and thus R(v, z) = 1 iff v ∈E.
Now to show the other direction. Suppose we have (v, S) ∈Maee such that ‖φ‖(v,S) < 1 and define M = (W, e, R) ∈
M
s
est as follows: Let W be a set of worlds such that W has the same cardinality as S ′ = {v} ∪ S. Hence there exists a 
bijection h :W → S′ :w →w′. The mapping e :W ×V → Sk is defined as e(w, ·) = h(w) and we define R =W ×E
with E = {w ∈ W | h(w) ∈ S}. We show by structural induction that for each formula γ and each w ∈ W we have 
‖γ ‖M,w = ‖γ ‖(h(w),S). The only interesting case is γ = Bα such that ‖α‖M,v = ‖α‖(h(v),S) for each v ∈W (induction 
hypothesis). But then we have for z ∈W by the induction hypothesis that
‖Bα‖M,z = inf{‖α‖M,v |R(z, v)= 1} = inf{‖α‖M,v | v ∈E}
= inf{‖α‖M,v | h(v) ∈ S} = inf{‖α‖(h(v),S) | h(v) ∈ S}
= ‖Bα‖(h(z),S)
In particular it then follows that ‖φ‖M,h−1(v) = ‖φ‖(v,S) < 1. 
To summarize, Table 1 provides a list of the languages and corresponding logics and semantics that have been 
introduced and used so far.
In [9] the authors characterize stable fuzzy expansions in terms of the above many-valued possible-world semantics. 
Indeed, the fuzzy belief set induced by an agent’s epistemic state S, denoted BelS , is defined in the natural way: for 
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define
BelS(ϕ)= ‖Bϕ‖S = inf
w∈S ‖ϕ‖(w,S).
Moreover, given a set of formulas A, a set of propositional evaluations SA is called a fuzzy autoepistemic model of 
A whenever
SA = {w ∈k | ‖φ‖(w,SA) = 1 for each φ ∈A}.
Intuitively, SA is the set of worlds or “sources” in which all formulas of A are true. Then the following result is proved 
in [9].
Proposition 4. A fuzzy set of formulas E : LB → Sk is a stable fuzzy expansion of a set of formulas A iff it is the belief 
set for some fuzzy autoepistemic model SA of A, i.e. E(φ) = ‖Bφ‖SA for each φ ∈ LB.
Example 4. Here we present an example for fuzzy autoepistemic reasoning in a scenario involving sensor networks. 
Suppose we have a wireless sensor network consisting of devices that can sense their environment and communicate 
wirelessly, for instance with the purpose of detecting forest fires in an early stage. We will use fuzzy autoepistemic 
logic to determine whether there are sensors not working optimally.
Let ti be the variable representing the temperature measured by sensor i. Suppose we have an appropriate rescaling 
to assure that all variables take values in k and let ei be the variable representing the degree to which sensor i is 
faulty.
Let us define a new connective d(ϕ, ψ)6 as ¬(ϕ ↔ψ) for which the semantics is given by the Euclidean distance dˆ : 
for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], dˆ(x, y) = |x − y|. Then, for i = j , the formulas
d(ti , tj )→ (ei ∨ ej )
capture the idea that if the sensed values of two sensors ti and tj are different, this provides a reason to believe that 
at least one of those two sensors is faulty. Note that we assume that all sensors are physically close to each other and 
thus they should measure the same temperature.
On the other hand, the formula
¬Bei → ¬ei
represents the default information that sensors are not faulty.
As a concrete case, we further assume we are told sensor e2 is very reliable, and hence we believe that sensor e2 is 
not faulty (B¬e2), and that the three measured values are t ′1 = 0.2, t ′2 = 0.9, t ′3 = 0.5.
The formalization of this scenario then amounts to consider the following theory:
A= {¬Be1 → ¬e1,¬Be2 → ¬e2,¬Be3 → ¬e3,B¬e2,0.7 → (e1 ∨ e2),0.4 → (e2 ∨ e3),0.3 → (e1 ∨ e3)}
Let us see what a stable expansion EA of A must look like.
Suppose there exists a fuzzy autoepistemic model S of A. Then by definition it holds that
S = {v ∈k | ∀α ∈A : ‖α‖(v,S) = 1}.
For every v ∈ S it must hold that ‖B¬e2‖(v,S) = 1 and thus that infw∈S(1 − w(e2)) = 1, i.e. that for all w ∈ S we 
have w(e2) = 0. Moreover since ‖¬Bei‖(v,S) ≤ ‖¬ei‖(v,S) it follows that 1 − ‖Bei‖(v,S) ≤ 1 − ‖ei‖(v,S) and thus 
v(ei) ≤ ‖Bei‖(v,S) = infw∈S w(ei). Since for every v ∈ S we also have infw∈S w(ei) ≤ v(ei), we obtain
v(ei)≤ inf
w∈S w(ei)≤ v(ei)
6 The connective d(ϕ, ψ) is well-known in the literature of many-valued logics and it is usually called Chang distance function [12]. The fact 
that d can be defined in a many-valued logical setting is a peculiarity of MV-algebras and also for this reason we believe these structures to be a 
suitable algebraic setting.
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follows that S = {v} is a singleton such that v(e2) = 0. Taking into account the remaining formulas in A we obtain 
that it must hold that 0.7 ≤ v(e1), 0.4 ≤ v(e3) and 0.3 ≤ max(v(e1), v(e3)). Actually, we can check that v is the 
minimal element in k such that these inequalities are satisfied, i.e. v(e1) = 0.7, v(e2) = 0 and v(e3) = 0.4. Indeed, 
let z ∈k such that z ≤ v and such that z satisfies the above inequalities. Then we obtain z(ei) ≤ v(ei) = infw∈S w(ei)
and thus ‖¬Bei → ¬ei‖(z,S) = ‖ei → Bei‖(z,S) = 1 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. This implies that z ∈ S, a contradiction if z = v. 
Hence if there exists a fuzzy autoepistemic model S of A it has to be
S = {v ∈k | v(e1)= 0.7, v(e2)= 0, v(e3)= 0.4}.
Using the definition one can now easily show that S is indeed a fuzzy autoepistemic model of A. In particular, it has 
to be shown that
{v ∈k | v(e1)= 0.7, v(e2)= 0, v(e3)= 0.4} = {w ∈k | ∀α ∈A : ‖α‖(w,S) = 1},
or in other words, if w = v, then ‖α‖(w,S) < 1 for some α ∈ A. The corresponding stable expansion EA : LB → Sk is 
such that EA(Be1) =EA(e1) = 0.7, EA(Be2) =EA(e2) = 0 and EA(Be3) =EA(e3) = 0.4.
5.3. Fuzzy stable sets
On the other hand, as in the classical case, we can also characterize fuzzy belief sets, and a forteriori stable fuzzy 
expansions, by the following graded version of syntactical Stalnaker’s notion of stable set of formulas (cf. [20]).
Definition 2. Let  : LB → Sk be a fuzzy set of formulas and let ˆ = {(ϕ)→ ϕ∗ | ϕ ∈ LB}. We say that  is a fuzzy 
stable set if the following conditions hold:
(1) ˆ is propositionally consistent, i.e. ˆ  0.
(2) If ˆ  c¯ → ϕ∗, then (ϕ) ≥ c.
(3) (ϕ) = (Bϕ).
(4) 1 − (ϕ) = (¬Bϕ).
The conditions (1)–(4) in Definition 2 are the graded counterparts of the classical ones in [20]. In particular, 
condition (3) expresses that fuzzy stable sets are closed by the belief operator B, i.e. ϕ belongs to  as much as Bϕ
does. On the other hand condition (4) expresses a kind of graded closed world assumption for fuzzy stable sets: Bϕ is 
not believed (in the sense of belonging to ) iff ϕ is not in the set .
Proposition 5.  is a fuzzy stable set iff  is a fuzzy belief set for some non-empty epistemic state. In other words,  is 
a fuzzy stable set iff  = BelS for some S = ∅.
Proof.
(⇐) First we show that a fuzzy belief set  is a fuzzy stable set. By definition of fuzzy belief set we know that there 
exists a ∅ = S ⊆ k such that (ϕ) = ‖Bϕ‖S for each formula ϕ. In order to show that ˆ is propositionally 
consistent, by the strong completeness of Łck , it is sufficient to show that there exists a v ∈∗k such that for each 
formula ϕ we have (ϕ) ≤ v(ϕ∗). Indeed, it then follows that for each ϕ we have v((ϕ) → ϕ∗) = 1 and thus 
v(α) = 1 for all α ∈ ˆ. Let w ∈ S be arbitrary but fixed and define v such that v(ϕ∗) = ‖ϕ‖(w,S) for each ϕ. It 
follows that
(ϕ)= inf
z∈S ‖ϕ‖(z,S) ≤ v(ϕ
∗)
which proves (1). Next, assume that ˆ  c¯ → ϕ∗, or by strong completeness of Łck that ˆ | c¯ → ϕ∗. We show 
that (ϕ) ≥ c. Note, similar as above, that for each w ∈ S we have that v with v(ψ∗) = ‖ψ‖(w,S) for all ψ ∈ LB
is a model of ˆ and hence of c¯ → ϕ∗. Therefore c ≤ ‖ϕ‖(w,S) for each w ∈ S and c ≤ infw∈S ‖ϕ‖(w,S) = (ϕ)
which proves (2). Proving (3) follows easily by noting that
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Finally, to show (4), observe that (¬Bϕ) equals
‖B¬Bϕ‖S = inf
w∈S ‖¬Bϕ‖(w,S) = infw∈S(1 − ‖Bϕ‖(w,S))= infw∈S(1 − (ϕ))
which is equal to 1 −(ϕ).
(⇒) Now, let  be a fuzzy stable set. Define
S∗ = {u ∈∗k | u(α)= 1,∀α ∈ ˆ}.
Note that S∗ is nonempty by (1). We show that for each ϕ and S = {u|V | u ∈ S∗} = ∅7 we have
(ϕ)= ‖Bϕ‖S.
First, note that for a formula ϕ we have by definition of S∗ that w((Bϕ) → (Bϕ)∗) = 1, or w((Bϕ)∗) ≥ (Bϕ), 
for each w ∈ S∗. By (3) it then follows that w((Bϕ)∗) ≥ (Bϕ) = (ϕ) for each w ∈ S∗. We show that also 
w((Bϕ)∗) ≤ (ϕ) from which it then follows that
w((Bϕ)∗)= (ϕ)
for each w ∈ S∗. Indeed, since (¬Bϕ) → (¬Bϕ)∗ is in ˆ and thus (¬Bϕ) ≤ w((¬Bϕ)∗) = w(¬(Bϕ)∗) we 
have
w((Bϕ)∗)= 1 −w(¬(Bϕ)∗)≤ 1 − (¬Bϕ).
Hence by (4) it follows that w((Bϕ)∗) ≤ (ϕ). We will now use the fact that
w((Bϕ)∗)= (ϕ)
for each w ∈ S∗ to show that for each formula α and each w ∈ S∗ we have w(α∗) = ‖α‖(w|V ,S) from which we 
can conclude that
(ϕ)=w((Bϕ)∗)= ‖Bϕ‖(w|V ,S) = ‖Bϕ‖S
for each formula ϕ and an arbitrary w ∈ S∗. We show w(α∗) = ‖α‖(w|V ,S) by structural induction. The only 
notable case is α = Bψ . By the definition of S∗ we have (ψ) ≤ u(ψ∗) for all u ∈ S∗ and hence
(ψ)≤ inf
u∈S∗ u(ψ
∗).
Now suppose that (ψ) < infu∈S∗ u(ψ∗), i.e. for each u ∈ S∗ we have (ψ) < u(ψ∗). Since the set of truth 
values is finite there exists a v ∈ S∗ such that v(ψ∗) = minu∈S∗ u(ψ∗). Hence for all u ∈ S∗ we have v(ψ∗) ≤
u(ψ∗) and thus u(v(ψ∗)→ψ∗) = 1. By the strong completeness of Łck and the definition of S∗ it follows that
ˆ  v(ψ∗)→ψ∗.
By (2), it then follows that (ψ) ≥ v(ψ∗). Since v ∈ S∗ it follows that (ψ) < v(ψ∗) and thus that (ψ) >
(ψ), a contradiction. Hence (ψ) = infu∈S∗ u(ψ∗) and by the induction hypothesis we conclude that
w(α∗)=w((Bψ)∗)= (ψ)= inf
u∈S∗ u(ψ
∗)
= inf
u∈S∗ ‖ψ‖(u|V ,S) = infz∈S ‖ψ‖(z,S) = ‖α‖(w|V ,S) 
By combining Propositions 4 and 5, we can easily derive the following list of properties that fuzzy stable expansions 
satisfy. Note that it would be more difficult to check these properties directly from the definition of fuzzy stable 
expansions.
7 u|V is the function u|V : V → Sk .
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(i) {φ ∈ LB |A∗  φ∗} ⊆EA;
(ii) r → φ ∈EA iff EA(φ) ≥ r;
(iii) If r → φ ∈EA and s → φ /∈EA for s > r , then EA(φ) = r;
(iv) EA(φ) = EA(Bφ), and hence φ ∈EA iff Bφ ∈EA;
(v) 1 −EA(φ) =EA(¬Bφ).
Proof. First of all, by Propositions 4 and 5 it follows that EA is a fuzzy stable set. Then, (i) is the trivial consequence 
of EA being (propositionally) deductively closed and containing A, (ii) and (iii) directly follows from the definition 
of EA, while (iv) and (v) are just translations from analogous properties of fuzzy stable sets from Proposition 5. 
This last proposition confirms that many natural properties that one would expect to hold for fuzzy stable expan-
sions are indeed satisfied. Firstly, (i) shows that all propositional consequences of the initial beliefs in A will belong 
(to degree 1) to any fuzzy stable expansion of A, i.e. EA contains at least all the logical consequences of A. Proper-
ties (ii) and (iii) state that an agent fully believes a formula of the kind r → φ iff he/she believes φ at least to degree 
r and if he/she does not fully believe s → φ to a higher degree s, then the degree of belief in φ should be exactly r . 
Finally, (iv) and (v) state that beliefs are closed by iterating B and by a closed world assumption principle.
6. “Only knowing” operators and stable fuzzy expansions
Let us extend LB with a modal operator O where a formula Oψ will be interpreted as “ψ is all that is believed”. 
We denote this language by LO. In the classical case [6], the semantics for a corresponding logic is defined as follows. 
Given an epistemic state S consisting of a set of classical evaluations, a formula Oψ is true in S whenever ψ is true 
in any structure (z, S) with z ∈ S, and false in any structure (z′, S) with z′ /∈ S.
We can straightforwardly generalize this condition to the many-valued case by defining
‖Oψ‖(w,S) = min(inf
z∈S ‖ψ‖(z,S), infz/∈S ‖¬ψ‖(z,S)),
where now w ∈k and S ⊆k . Other formulas are evaluated as in fuzzy autoepistemic logic. If we then add another 
modal operator N whose truth evaluation in a pair (w, S) is
‖Nψ‖(w,S) = inf
z/∈S ‖ψ‖(z,S),
then it is easy to see that the semantics of Oψ is exactly that of Bψ ∧ N¬ψ . Notice that ‖Nψ‖(w,S) = ‖Bψ‖(w,k\S). 
Hence by Theorem 4 it follows that N is another K45 “operator”. Again, since the truth value of Oψ (and Nψ ) in a 
structure (w, S) does not depend on w, we will also write ‖Oψ‖S and ‖Nψ‖S to denote ‖Oψ‖(w,S) and ‖Nψ‖(w,S)
respectively.
There is an intuitive link between the operator N and the guaranteed possibility function of [23]. However, there 
are some clear differences as well. Here we consider crisp accessibility relations over graded worlds, whereas [23]
considers graded accessibility relations (encoded by possibility distributions) between Boolean, i.e. classical, worlds. 
The fact that only knowing can be understood as the conjunction of belief (necessity) and guaranteed possibility was 
already pointed out in [24] in a classical context.
To summarize, the language LO we consider is built from propositional variables in V , truth constants {r | r ∈ Sk}, 
the connectives from Łukasiewicz logic and modal operators B, N and O. We evaluate formulas using the class of 
semantical structures Mae = {(w, S) | w ∈ k, S ⊆ k}. The truth of a formula φ ∈ LO relative to a structure (w, S)
is inductively defined as follows:
– If φ is a propositional formula from LO, then ‖φ‖(w,S) =w(φ).
– If φ is a truth constant c, then ‖φ‖(w,S) = c.
– If φ = Bψ , then ‖φ‖(w,S) = inf{‖ψ‖(v,S) | v ∈ S}.
– If φ = Nψ , then ‖φ‖(w,S) = inf{‖ψ‖(v,S) | v /∈ S}.
– If φ =ψ → γ , then ‖φ‖(w,S) = (‖ψ‖(w,S) ⇒ ‖γ ‖(w,S)).
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complement k \ S for the semantics of N.
As in the classical case [6], we will provide a sound and complete axiomatization for the fuzzy logic of “only 
knowing”, which we will denote as O(Łck). Specifically, O(Ł
c
k) has the following axioms:
(i) axioms of Łck ,
(ii) axioms of K45(Łck) for both B and N,
(iii) φ → Bφ, where all variables and constants in φ occur in the scope of an operator N or B,
(iv) φ → Nφ, where all variables and constants in φ occur in the scope of an operator N or B,
(v) ¬Bφ ∨ ¬Nφ, if ¬φ is satisfiable and does not contain any modal operator,
(vi) Oφ ↔ (Bφ ∧ N¬φ),
and the following inference rules: modus ponens and necessitation rules for N and B.
Axioms (iii)–(vi) are many-valued versions of the ones proposed by Levesque in [6]. For axioms (iii) and (iv), the 
idea is to capture the fact that the truth value of a truth constant or any formula ϕ starting by a modality B or N in 
a model (w, S) depends only on S and not on the particular interpretation w. Hence, that value will also coincide 
with the value of Bϕ or Nϕ, since they are the infimum of identical values. In other words, together with axiom (4), 
they specify that we can avoid nested beliefs (in the general sense of B, N and O). The intuition behind axiom (v) 
is the following. Since a propositional formula φ that is not a tautology cannot be true to degree 1 in all possible 
worlds, an agent cannot believe φ in a given epistemic state S and believe φ in the complementary epistemic state 
k \S. Actually one can check that in our fuzzy framework all the above axioms are tautologies and the rules preserve 
tautologies in every structure (w, S) ∈Mae. In particular, we have the following result.
Lemma 5. The axioms (i)–(vi) are sound w.r.t. the class of structures Mae.
Proof. Axioms (i) and (ii) follow from previous results.
Axioms (iii) and (iv) are easy to check. It only has to be shown that these axioms are tautologies for formulas of the 
form φ = Bα and φ = Nα. Indeed by truth functionality we then obtain that these axioms are tautologies for formulas 
where all variables and constants occur in the scope of an operator N or B. For axiom (iii), (w, S) ∈Mae and φ = Bα
we have
‖Bφ‖(w,S) = inf
v∈S ‖Bα‖(v,S) = infz∈S ‖α‖(z,S) = ‖φ‖(w,S).
The other cases follow similarly.
For axiom (v), suppose ¬φ is satisfiable, i.e. there exists w∗ ∈∗k such that w∗(φ) = 0. For a structure (w, S) ∈Mae
we then have ‖¬Bφ∨¬Nφ‖(w,S) = 1 iff max(‖¬Bφ‖(w,S), ‖¬Nφ‖(w,S)) = 1 iff ‖Bφ‖(w,S) = 0 or ‖Nφ‖(w,S) = 0 iff 
there exists z ∈ S such that z(φ) = ‖φ‖(z,S) = 0 or there exists z /∈ S such that z(φ) = ‖φ‖(z,S) = 0. This is satisfied 
by the fact that there exists w′ ∈k = S ∪ (k \ S) such that w′(φ) = 0. Indeed let w′ =w∗|V . 
Similarly as in Section 3, we can show that there exists a reduction of the satisfiability problem for the fuzzy logic 
of only knowing to the classical counterpart. For every structure (w, S) ∈Mae we then have ‖(φ ↔ r)‖(w,S) = 1 iff 
‖φ‖(w,S) = r . Define L′O ⊆ LO as the set of formulas built from atomic propositions of the form {(p ↔ r) | p ∈ V,
r ∈ Sk}, Łukasiewicz connectives and operators B, N and O:
– (p ↔ r) ∈ L′O for every p ∈ V and r ∈ Sk
– (φ →ψ) ∈ L′O if φ, ψ ∈ L′O
– Bφ ∈ L′O if φ ∈ L′O
– Nφ ∈ L′O if φ ∈ L′O
– Oφ ∈ L′O if φ ∈ L′O
Lemma 6. Given a formula φ ∈ LO and a truth value r ∈ Sk , there exists a formula (φr)′ ∈ L′O such that for each 
structure (w, S) ∈Mae it holds that
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where φr is a short notation for the formula (φ ↔ r) with φ ∈ LO.
Proof. This lemma can be shown in a similar way as in the proof of Lemma 3. In particular the claim now also has to 
be checked for formulas of the form Nφ which can be done entirely analogously as for formulas of the form Bφ. 
We will use this lemma together with the following proposition to show that the proposed axiomatization is 
complete w.r.t. the proposed semantics. In Proposition 7 and Theorem 5, besides the languages LO and L′O and 
structures Mae, we also consider the following languages:
• L+O, which is an extension of LO with an additional set of variables Vˆ = {pr | p ∈ V, r ∈ Sk}, i.e. the language 
built from variables V ∪ Vˆ , Łukasiewicz connectives and operators B, N and O;
• LCO, built from variables Vˆ , classical connectives (∧, ∨, ¬, →) and operators B, N and O;
and the following classes of semantic structures:
• Mae+ = {(w, S) |w ∈+k , S ⊆+k } where +k = {w |w : V ∪ Vˆ → Sk};
• MaeB = {(w, S) |w ∈Bk , S ⊆Bk } where Bk = {w |w : Vˆ → {0, 1}}.
Proposition 7. Suppose φ ∈ L′O is a tautology w.r.t. Mae, then φ is provable in O(Łck).
Proof. Suppose φ ∈ L′O is a tautology in Mae. Define φ′′ as the formula in L+O obtained by replacing each subformula 
(p ↔ r) by the atom pr ∈ Vˆ . We show that  ′′ → φ′′, with
 ′′ =
⎡
⎣ ∧
p∈V,r∈Sk
((p ↔ r)↔ pr)
⎤
⎦ ,
is a tautology in Mae+ . Indeed, consider a structure (w, S) in Mae+ . Note that ‖ ′′‖(w,S) = 1 if ‖(p ↔ r)‖(w,S) =
‖pr‖(w,S) for all p ∈ V and ‖ ′′‖(w,S) = 0 otherwise. If ‖ ′′‖(w,S) = 1, then ‖φ′′‖(w,S) = 1 since φ is a tautol-
ogy in Mae and in this case we have ‖(p ↔ r)‖(w,S) = ‖pr‖(w,S) for all p ∈ V . If ‖ ′′‖(w,S) = 0, then trivially 
‖ ′′‖(w,S) ≤ ‖φ′′‖(w,S). Hence, in both cases we obtain ‖ ′′ → φ′′‖(w,S) = 1.
Next we show that ′′ → φ′′, with
′′ =
∧
p∈V
⎛
⎝∨
r∈Sk
pr ∧
∧
s,t∈Sk,s =t
¬(pr ∧ ps)
⎞
⎠ ,
is a tautology in MaeB . Indeed, consider a structure (wˆ, Sˆ) in M
ae
B . We show that ‖′′‖(wˆ,Sˆ) = 1 implies ‖φ′′‖(wˆ,Sˆ) = 1. 
Suppose that ‖′′‖
(wˆ,Sˆ)
= 1. By the definition of ′′, it then holds that for each p ∈ V there exists exactly one 
rp ∈ Sk such that wˆ(prp ) = ‖prp‖(wˆ,Sˆ) = 1. We will now show that there exists a (w, S) ∈Mae+ such that ‖φ′′‖(wˆ,Sˆ) =
‖φ′′‖(w,S) and such that ‖ ′′‖(w,S) = 1. Since  ′′ → φ′′ is a tautology in Mae+ we then obtain that ‖φ′′‖(wˆ,Sˆ) = 1. To 
do this, we first define a mapping f : Bk → +k as follows. For vˆ ∈ Bk , let f (vˆ) : V ∪ Vˆ → Sk be the evaluation 
such that (f (vˆ))(pr) = vˆ(pr) for all pr ∈ Vˆ and for each p ∈ V let (f (vˆ)(p)) = rp where rp is the unique element in 
Sk such that vˆ(prp ) = ‖prp‖(vˆ,Sˆ) = 1. We define (w, S) ∈Mae+ as follows: w = f (wˆ) and S = {f (vˆ) | vˆ ∈ Sˆ}. It then 
holds that ‖ ′′‖(w,S) = 1 and ‖φ′′‖(wˆ,Sˆ) = ‖φ′′‖(w,S).
Since ′′ → φ′′ is a tautology in MaeB and the classical logic of only knowing is sound and complete w.r.t. MaeB
[6], there is a corresponding proof  for ′′ → φ′′. We will transform this proof to a proof for φ′ in O(Łck). First note 
that ′, which is obtained from ′′ by replacing each pr by (p ↔ r), is a theorem in Łck and hence also a theorem 
in O(Łck). By modus ponens, it is now sufficient to show that ′ → φ′ is a theorem as well. This follows trivially by 
substituting in every formula in  expressions of the form pr by (p ↔ r). 
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Theorem 5. Every tautology in Mae is a theorem in O(Łck).
Proof. Suppose φ is a tautology in Mae. Trivially, φ1 = φ is a tautology as well and by Lemma 6, it follows that 
(φ1)′ ∈ L′O constructed analogously as in Lemma 3 is also a tautology. By Proposition 7 it then follows that there is a 
proof for (φ1)′ in O(Łck). We will now show that this implies that there also exists a proof for φ in O(Łck). We will do 
this by showing that for each ϕ ∈ LO and for each r ∈ Sk it holds that ϕr = (ϕ ↔ r) is provably equivalent to (ϕr)′
as constructed in Lemma 3, i.e. that O(Łck) proves ϕr ↔ (ϕr)′. In particular, this implies that (φ1)′ and φ1 = φ are 
provable equivalent formulas. Since by Proposition 7, (φ1)′ is a theorem in O(Łck) it then follows that φ and hence 
φ is a theorem as well.
Let us show by induction that for each ϕ ∈ LO and for each r ∈ Sk it holds that ϕr = (ϕ ↔ r) is provably 
equivalent to (ϕr)′. The only non-trivial step in this proof is to show that there exists a (Bαr)′ ∈ LO provably equivalent 
to (Bα ↔ r) given that the claim holds for α. The case of N can be proved analogously. First note that if r < 1, 
Łck proves that (Bα ↔ r) is equivalent to(∨
t≥r
(Bα ↔ t)
)
∧
⎛
⎝¬ ∨
t≥r+
(Bα ↔ t)
⎞
⎠
where r+ is the successor of r . Now using axioms (B2)–(B4) and the fact that B(ϕ ⊗ ϕ) ↔ Bϕ ⊗ Bϕ, and hence 
Bϕ ↔Bϕ is a theorem of K45(Łck), the following expression can be derived from (Bα ↔ r).
B
(∨
t≥r
(α ↔ t)
)
∧ ¬B
⎛
⎝∨
t≥r+
(α ↔ t)
⎞
⎠ .
By the induction hypothesis, there exists for each t ≥ r a formula (αt )′ ∈ LO that is equivalent to (α ↔ t). Therefore, 
(Bα ↔ r) is equivalent to
B
(∨
t≥r
(αt )
′
)
∧ ¬B
⎛
⎝∨
t≥r+
(αt )
′
⎞
⎠ ∈ L′O.
If, on the other hand r = 1, then we have to show that Bα is equivalent to Bα. As previously mentioned, this is a 
theorem of KD45(Łck). 
Finally, we show that the relationship between the “only knowing” operator O and Moore’s stable expansions 
proved in [6] naturally extends to our framework. The next proposition shows that the belief set BelS for an epistemic 
state defined by a set of Łk-evaluations S is indeed a stable fuzzy expansion of a premise ϕ whenever ϕ is all what 
is fully believed in the epistemic state S.
This proposition can easily be generalized to stable fuzzy expansions of sets of formulas.
Proposition 8. Suppose A = {φ1, . . . , φn} is a set of formulas in LB. Then BelS is a stable fuzzy expansion of A iff 
‖O(φ1 ∧ . . .∧φn)‖S = 1.
Proof. Since for a formula ψ we have ‖Oψ‖S = min(‖Bψ‖S, ‖N¬ψ‖S), we have the following chain of equiva-
lences:
‖O(φ1 ∧ . . .∧φn)‖S = 1
⇔ ‖B(φ1 ∧ . . .∧φn)‖S = 1 and ‖N(¬(φ1 ∧ . . .∧φn))‖S = 1
⇔ ∀v ∈ S : ‖φ1 ∧ . . .∧φn‖(v,S) = 1 and
∀v /∈ S : ‖φ1 ∧ . . .∧φn‖(v,S) = 0
⇔ ∀v ∈ S,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ‖φi‖(v,S) = 1 and
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⇔ ∀v ∈ S,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ‖φi‖(v,S) = 1 and
∀v /∈ S,∃j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : ‖φj‖(v,S) < 1
Thus, assuming that ‖O(φ1 ∧ . . .∧φn)‖S = 1, we can show that S = {v ∈k | ‖φi‖(v,S) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. 
Indeed, by the previous statement we have S ⊆ {v ∈ k | ‖φi‖(v,S) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. If w ∈ {v ∈ k |
‖φi‖(v,S) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} and suppose that w /∈ S, then we would have that there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that ‖φj‖(w,S) < 1, a contradiction. Hence S = {v ∈ k | ‖φi‖(v,S) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}. Similar, one can 
also show that S = {v ∈ k | ‖φi‖(v,S) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} implies that for all v ∈ S we have ‖φi‖(v,S) = 1 for 
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for all v /∈ S we have that there exists a j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that ‖φj‖(v,S) < 1. Hence
‖O(φ1 ∧ . . .∧φn)‖S = 1
⇔ S = {v ∈k | ‖φi‖(v,S) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}
⇔ S is a fuzzy autoepistemic model of A
⇔ BelS is a stable fuzzy expansion of A,
where the last equivalence follows from Proposition 4. 
The next lemma proves interesting properties about graded beliefs the only knowing operator O captures inside the 
(monotonic) many-valued modal logic O(Łck) related to similar features of the (non-monotonic) fuzzy autoepistemic 
logic. We recall that a propositional formula ϕ is r-satisfiable, for r ∈ Sk , if there exists an evaluation w ∈ k such 
that w(ϕ) = r .
Proposition 9. If ϕ is a propositional formula and r-satisfiable for some r ∈ Sk , then O(Łck) proves the following formulas:
(i) N(¬(r → ϕ)) → (Bϕ → r)
(ii) O((r → ϕ)) → (Bϕ ↔ r)
Proof. Let φ =(r ↔ ϕ).
(i) Obviously, ϕ is r-satisfiable iff φ is 1-satisfiable, and since φ is Boolean, by axiom (v) of the logic O(Łck) we 
have that N(¬(r ↔ ϕ)) → ¬B¬(r ↔ ϕ) is a theorem. Since (r ↔ ϕ) → (ϕ → r) is a theorem in Łck we can 
derive that the following formula is a theorem in O(Łck):
¬B(¬(r ↔ ϕ))→ ¬B(¬(ϕ → r))
Hence O(Łck) proves
N(¬(r ↔ ϕ))→ ¬B(¬(ϕ → r)).
Since by axiom (B3),
¬B(¬(ϕ → r)) → (Bϕ → r)
is a theorem, (i) is proved.
(ii) follows by observing that Oφ is equivalent to Bφ ∧ N¬φ, and hence Oφ → Bφ is a theorem, i.e. B(r ↔ ϕ). 
Since (r ↔ ϕ) → (r → ϕ) is a theorem in Łck we obtain that
B((r ↔ ϕ))→ B(r → ϕ)
is a theorem in O(Łck). Since B(r → ϕ) is equivalent to r → Bϕ by axiom (B3), we obtain that
B((r ↔ ϕ))→ (r → Bϕ)
is a theorem in O(Łck). Finally, taking into account (i), we get that O(Łck) proves O((r → ϕ)) → (Bϕ ↔ r). 
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we let
φA =(B¬e2)∧(¬Be1 → ¬e1)∧(¬Be2 → ¬e2)∧(¬Be3 → ¬e3)
∧(0.7 → (e1 ∨ e2))∧(0.4 → (e2 ∨ e3))∧(0.3 → (e1 ∨ e3))
Then, by the above proposition, if we “only know” φA, i.e. if we assume OφA, one can infer (both semantically and 
syntactically) for example the following graded beliefs:
0.7 ↔ Be1,¬Be2,0.4 ↔ Be3,0.3 ↔ B¬e1,B¬e2, and 0.6 ↔ B¬e3.
As an example, let us now use Proposition 8 to find the stable fuzzy expansion of
A= {¬Be1 → ¬e1,¬Be2 → ¬e2,¬Be3 → ¬e3,B¬e2,0.7 → e1 ∨ e2,0.4 → e2 ∨ e3,0.3 → e1 ∨ e3}
from Example 4.
Suppose S is a fuzzy autoepistemic model of A, then by Proposition 8 it should hold that ‖OφA‖S = 1. By the 
semantics of the operator O, it follows that
‖B((¬Be1 → ¬e1)∧(¬Be2 → ¬e2)∧(¬Be3 → ¬e3)∧(B¬e2)
∧(0.7 → (e1 ∨ e2))∧(0.4 → (e2 ∨ e3))∧(0.3 → (e1 ∨ e3)))‖S = 1
and hence by the semantics of the operator B we obtain for all v ∈ S and for all φ ∈ A that ‖φ‖(v,S) = 1 and hence 
that ‖φ‖(v,S) = 1. The same computations as in Example 4 imply that this is only possible if
S = {v ∈k | v(e1)= 0.7, v(e2)= 0, v(e3)= 0.4}.
To obtain that S is a fuzzy autoepistemic model of A, it remains to be shown that
‖N¬((¬Be1 → ¬e1)∧(¬Be2 → ¬e2)∧(¬Be3 → ¬e3)∧(B¬e2)
∧(0.7 → (e1 ∨ e2))∧(0.4 → (e2 ∨ e3))∧(0.3 → (e1 ∨ e3)))‖S = 1
Or in other words, it has to be shown that for all w /∈ S there exists φ ∈ A such that ‖φ‖(w,S) < 1. Suppose this is 
not the case and there exists w /∈ S such that for all φ ∈ A it holds that ‖φ‖(w,S) = 1. Since for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we 
have ‖¬Bei → ¬ei‖(w,S) = 1 it follows that w(ei) ≤ infz∈S z(ei) = v(ei). Since w = v there exists j ∈ {1, 3} such 
that w(ej ) < v(ej ) and w(e2) = 0. If j = 1, since ‖0.7 → e1 ∨ e2‖w,S = 1, we obtain
w(e1) < v(e1)= 0.7 ≤w(e1 ∨ e2)=w(e1),
a contradiction. For j = 3 we obtain a similar contradiction.
7. Related work
Many-valued modal logics have appeared in the literature under different forms and contexts. In [25,26], a modal 
logic with truth values in finite Heyting algebras is introduced. These modal systems are then used for dealing with 
opinions of experts with a dominance relation among them. Other papers mainly offer theoretical frameworks. For 
instance, in the last years there has been some work on fuzzy modal logics with generalized Kripke semantics, see e.g. 
[17]. In particular, in [17], they systematically investigate many-valued modal logics over a residuated lattice, dealing 
with accessibility relations that can take values in this lattice as well as relations taking only values  and ⊥ in the 
lattice. In the current paper we have focused on modal systems based on a finite set of linearly ordered truth values 
with Łukasiewicz logic semantics for connectives which generate the class of finite MV-algebras [21]. These systems 
represent a good compromise between expressive power and nice logical properties. The infinitely-valued case offers 
some problems, see e.g. [27] where infinitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic is extended with a modality and the results 
involve an infinitary deduction rule. Another example is the case of S5 with total accessibility relations [28]. In that 
paper the fact that formulas are in correspondence with formulas of the monadic fuzzy predicate calculus is used to 
propose a sound and complete axiomatization by interpreting the modality as “∀”. However, for KD45 and K45 this 
trick does not work since in these cases the modality cannot be interpreted in such a way. On the other hand, a closely 
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truth values which means that the truth values are not necessarily linearly ordered, are considered. The formalization 
is very similar, but he also deals with common belief. Here we rather focus on providing a formal basis for the fuzzy 
generalization of autoepistemic logic developed in [9].
Autoepistemic logic is among the most extensively studied nonmonotonic formal systems and is known to be 
equivalent to several other modal nonmonotonic reasoning systems such as the logic of only knowing [6] and is closely 
related to default logic [30]. Besides in [9], many-valued extensions of autoepistemic logic have also been addressed 
by e.g. Fitting [31] in the context of finite Heyting algebras of truth values. The latter is actually an extension of the 
earlier mentioned work in [25,26] to the nonmonotonic setting. Reflexive autoepistemic logic has almost identical 
semantic characterizations of stable expansions as autoepistemic logic but defines the modality so that it models 
knowledge rather than belief. It can also be used to characterize the semantics of ASP [32] and has been generalized 
in [33] using finite Heyting algebras.
8. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have introduced Hilbert-style axiomatizations for fuzzy modal logics of belief as well as for a 
“logic of only knowing” based on finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic. In particular, we have introduced generalizations 
of the main classical propositional modal logics of belief (K45, KD45, S5) in order to model the notion of belief 
on fuzzy propositions, in the sense of admitting partial degrees of truth between 0 (fully false) and 1 (fully true). 
We have shown that their Kripke style semantics can also be used to provide a possible world semantics for fuzzy 
autoepistemic logic, in line with the original work of Moore [4]. We have also developed a fuzzy version of Levesque’s 
(propositional) logic of “only knowing”, proving soundness and completeness, and in particular we have generalized 
bridges with autoepistemic logic established in [6] for the classical case by characterizing fuzzy stable expansions in 
terms of models of suitable “only knowing” formulas.
The paper also leaves some interesting open problems to be dealt with in future developments. A first question is 
considering whether fuzzy accessibility relations instead of crisp ones would make the approach significantly more 
general. From an application point of view, keeping accessibility relations crisp makes it easier to interpret the truth 
degree of a formula. If we would have fuzzy accessibility relations in addition to graded truth, the truth degree of a 
formula Bφ depends on the degree to which φ is believed and on how certain we are of that belief. Also, note that crisp 
accessibility relations seem to be sufficient for practical purposes, and in particular for making the link with fuzzy 
autoepistemic logic in the sense of [9] and fuzzy answer set programming in the sense of [10]. On the other hand, it also 
seems interesting to consider fuzzy accessibility relations e.g. under the form of a possibility distribution on the set of 
worlds, since this would allow us to consider scenarios in which beliefs can be both graded and uncertain. Another type 
of generalization that may be interesting to look at would be to start from other logics than finitely-valued Łukasiewicz
logic. Although, if one wants to remain in a finitely-valued framework, (k + 1)-valued Łukasiewicz logic seems to 
be the best choice regarding the expressive power, unless one prefers a purely ordinal level. In this case one could 
use Gödel caculi and related logics, possibly equipped with an extra involutive negation. Moving to infinitely-valued 
logics, in particular to the [0, 1]-valued Łukasiewicz logic Ł, may bring technical difficulties as Ł is not strongly 
complete for arbitrary sets of premises, an important property in our current approach.
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Appendix A. Proofs of some results
Lemma 1. Let L be any of the logics K45(Łck), KD45(Łck), S5(Łck). Suppose T ∪ {ψ} is a set of formulas from LB and 
let 
L = {φ∗ |L φ}. Then it holds that T L ψ iff T ∗ ∪
L ψ∗.
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L is 
then easily obtained by replacing all formulas γi in  by γ ∗i . Indeed, notice that for all i it holds that γi is one of the 
following
• an element in T , and then γ ∗i is an element of T ∗;• an instance of an axiom of L, and then γ ∗i is an element of 
L;• a formula obtained by modus ponens from γj = γk → γi and γk , with j, k < i. Then γ ∗i is also obtained by modus 
ponens from γ ∗j and γ ∗k ;
• a formula Bγj obtained by necessitation from a theorem γj (j < i) of L. Then γi is a theorem in L and γ ∗i is an 
element of 
L.
Conversely, suppose there is a proof  = (φ1, . . . , φn) for ψ∗ in Łck from T ∗ ∪ 
L. The sequence  can then be 
converted to a proof for ψ in L from T as follows.
• If φi ∈
L, i.e. φi = γ ∗i with L γi , then replace φi by γi and add a proof for γi .• Otherwise, replace φi = γ ∗i by γi . 
Proposition 1. Let L ∈ {K45(Łck), KD45(Łck), S5(Łck)}, then the following conditions hold
1. If L contains axiom (T) then RLcan is reflexive.
2. If L contains axiom (4) then RLcan is transitive.
3. If L contains axiom (5) then RLcan is Euclidean.
4. If L contains axiom (D) then RLcan is serial.
Proof. In this proof we frequently use the result from Lemma 2: for every v ∈WLcan and every formula φ it holds that 
v(φ∗) = ‖φ‖MLcan,v .
1. Let w ∈ WLcan. Suppose that w((Bφ)∗) = 1, we show w(φ∗) = 1. Then it follows by the construction of the canon-
ical model that RLcan(w, w) = 1. Since L contains axiom (T), we have (Bφ → φ)∗ ∈ 
L and it follows that 1 =
w((Bφ → φ)∗) = ‖Bφ → φ‖MLcan,w . Hence 1 =w((Bφ)∗) = ‖Bφ‖MLcan,w ≤ ‖φ‖MLcan,w =w(φ∗).
2. Let w1, w2, w3 ∈WLcan such that RLcan(w1, w2) =RLcan(w2, w3) = 1. We show that RLcan(w1, w3) = 1. Suppose that 
w1((Bφ)∗) = 1, we show w3(φ∗) = 1. Since L contains axiom (4), we have (Bφ → BBφ)∗ ∈ 
L and it follows that 
1 = w1((Bφ → BBφ)∗) = ‖Bφ → BBφ‖MLcan,w1 , and hence that 1 = w1((Bφ)∗) = ‖Bφ‖MLcan,w1 ≤ ‖BBφ‖MLcan,w1 =
w1((BBφ)∗). Since RLcan(w1, w2) = 1, we then have that w2((Bφ)∗) = 1 and subsequently, since RLcan(w2, w3) = 1, 
that w3(φ∗) = 1.
3. Let w1, w2, w3 ∈WLcan such that RLcan(w1, w2) =RLcan(w1, w3) = 1. We show that RLcan(w2, w3) = 1. Suppose that 
w2((Bφ)∗) = 1, we show w3(φ∗) = 1. By definition of B,
‖B¬Bφ‖MLcan,w1 = inf{‖¬Bφ‖MLcan,w |RLcan(w1,w)= 1},
hence in particular ‖B¬Bφ‖MLcan,w1 ≤ ‖¬Bφ‖MLcan,w2 . Now since ‖¬Bφ‖MLcan,w2 = 1 − ‖Bφ‖MLcan,w2 = 1 −
w2((Bφ)∗) = 0, we obtain ‖B¬Bφ‖MLcan,w1 = 0. But since (¬B¬Bφ → Bφ)∗ ∈ 
L because of axiom (5), it fol-
lows that
1 =w1((¬B¬Bφ → Bφ)∗)= ‖¬B¬Bφ → Bφ‖MLcan,w1
and hence 1 = ‖¬B¬Bφ‖MLcan,w1 ≤ ‖Bφ‖MLcan,w1 = w1((Bφ)∗). Finally, since RLcan(w1, w3) = 1, it then follows that 
w3(φ∗) = 1.
4. Let w1 ∈ WLcan. We show that there exists w2 ∈ WLcan such that RLcan(w1, w2) = 1. Since by axiom (D) we have 
(¬B¬1)∗ ∈ 
L, it follows that 1 = w1((¬B¬1)∗) = ‖¬B¬1‖MLcan,w1 , and thus 0 = ‖B¬1‖MLcan,w1 = inf{‖0‖MLcan,w |
RLcan(w1, w) = 1}. Therefore the latter set must be non-empty, and hence there must exist w2 ∈ WLcan such that 
RLcan(w1, w2) = 1. 
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c
k) and S5(Ł
c
k) are sound and complete w.r.t. the classes Mset, Msest and Msrsyt respec-
tively.
Proof. We only prove the case of KD45(Łck), the other cases being easy variations. By Theorem 2, it is sufficient 
to show that Mest and Msest have the same tautologies. Since Msest is a subclass of Mest, we only have to show that 
if for a formula φ there exists an M = (W, e, R) ∈ Mest and w ∈ W such that ‖φ‖M,w < 1, then there exist an 
M ′ = (W ′, e′, R′) ∈Msest and w′ ∈W ′ such that ‖φ‖M ′,w′ < 1.
Suppose such a Kripke model M = (W, e, R) ∈Mest and w ∈W are given. Define E = {v ∈W |R(w, v) = 1}. By 
the seriality of R we have E = ∅. We define M ′ as follows: W ′ = {w} ∪E, e′ :W ′ ×V → Sk : (w, p) → e(w, p) and 
R′ =W ′ ×E.
Notice that for any v ∈ E we have E = {z ∈ W | R(v, z) = 1}. Indeed, for every z ∈ E we have R(w, z) = 1 and 
since R is Euclidean and R(w, v) = 1 (because v ∈ E) it follows that R(v, z) = 1 as well, and hence E ⊆ {z ∈ W |
R(v, z) = 1}. On the other hand, since R is transitive, if R(v, z) = 1, then since R(w, v) = 1 it follows R(w, z) = 1
and thus z ∈E, and hence {z ∈W |R(z, v) = 1} ⊆E. Therefore, E = {z ∈W |R(v, z) = 1} for all v ∈E.
We will now use this result to show by structural induction that for each ψ ∈ LB it holds that ‖ψ‖M,v = ‖ψ‖M ′,v
for every v ∈ E. The only notable case is when ψ = Bα, but this follows by the fact that E = {z ∈ W | R(v, z) = 1}
for all v ∈E and by the hypothesis:
‖Bα‖M,v = inf{‖α‖M,z |R(v, z)= 1}
= inf{‖α‖M,z | z ∈E}
= inf{‖α‖M ′,z | z ∈E}
= inf{‖α‖M ′,z |R′(v, z)= 1}
= ‖Bα‖M ′,v
where we use that R′ =W ′ ×E.
We will use this last result to show that ‖ψ‖M,w = ‖ψ‖M ′,w for all ψ ∈ LB . In particular, it then follows that 
‖φ‖M ′,w = ‖φ‖M,w < 1. We will show this by structural induction. Again, the only notable case is when ψ = Bα:
‖Bα‖M ′,w = inf{‖α‖M ′,z |R′(w, z)= 1}
= inf{‖α‖M ′,z | z ∈E}
= inf{‖α‖M,z | z ∈E}
= inf{‖α‖M,z |R(w,z) = 1}
= ‖Bα‖M,w 
Lemma 2. For any formula φ ∈ LB and truth value r ∈ Sk , there exists a formula (φr)′ ∈ L′B such that for each Kripke 
model M = (W, e, R) ∈M and each world w ∈W it holds that
‖φr‖M,w = ‖(φr)′‖M,w.
Proof. We show this lemma by induction on the structure of the formula.
• If φ = p ∈ V , then we can choose (φr)′ =(p ↔ r).
• Suppose that φ = c with c ∈ Sk . Then ‖φr‖M,w = 1 iff r = c. If c = r , then we can choose any tautology in L′B , 
e.g. (φr )′ = (p ↔ 1) ↔ (p ↔ 1) with p ∈ V arbitrary. If c = r , then we can choose any contradiction, e.g. 
(φr)
′ = ¬((p ↔ 1) ↔(p ↔ 1)) with p ∈ V arbitrary.
• Suppose the claim holds for formulas φ and ψ , i.e. for every s ∈ Sk there exist some (φs)′ and (ψs)′ in L′B such 
that ‖φs‖M,w = ‖(φs)′‖M,w and ‖ψs‖M,w = ‖(ψs)′‖M,w . We show that the lemma also holds for α = φ → ψ . 
Indeed, for r ∈ Sk we choose
(αr)
′ =
∨
{(φs)′ ∧ (ψt )′ | r = (s ⇒ t)}.s,t∈Sk
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‖αr‖M,w = 1 ⇔ (‖φ‖M,w ⇒ ‖ψ‖M,w)= r
⇔ ∃s, t ∈ Sk : ‖φ‖M,w = s,‖ψ‖M,w = t, r = (s ⇒ t)
⇔ ∃s, t ∈ Sk : ‖φs‖M,w = 1,‖ψt‖M,w = 1, r = (s ⇒ t)
⇔ ∃s, t ∈ Sk : ‖(φs)′‖M,w = 1,‖(ψt )′‖M,w = 1, r = (s ⇒ t)
⇔ ‖(αr)′‖M,w = 1
Since αr and (αr)′ are both Boolean formulas it follows that ‖αr‖M,w = ‖(αr)′‖M,w .
• Suppose the claim holds for a formula φ, i.e. for every s ∈ Sk there exist some (φs)′ in L′B such that ‖φs‖M,w =‖(φs)′‖M,w . We show that it also holds for α = Bφ. Suppose that r ∈ Sk . If r = 1, then consider (α1)′ = B(φ1)′ ∈
L′B :
‖α1‖M,w = 1 ⇔ ‖Bφ‖M,w = 1
⇔ inf{‖φ‖M,v |R(w,v)= 1} = 1
⇔ ∀v ∈W such that R(w,v)= 1 : ‖φ‖M,v = 1
⇔ ∀v ∈W such that R(w,v)= 1 : ‖φ1‖M,v = 1
⇔ ∀v ∈W such that R(w,v)= 1 : ‖(φ1)′‖M,v = 1
⇔ inf{‖(φ1)′‖M,v |R(w,v)= 1} = 1
⇔ ‖B(φ1)′‖M,w = 1
⇔ ‖(αr)′‖M,w = 1
If r < 1, then let r+ be the successor of r , i.e. if r = i
k
, then r+ = i+1
k
. Define formulas φ≥r , φ>r , φ≤r and φ<r
as disjunctions8 of formulas φs , e.g. φ≥r =∨s≥r φs and ‖φ≥r‖M,w = 1 iff ‖φ‖M,w ≥ r . Then we have that αr is 
equivalent to α≥r ∧ ¬(α≥r+).
First note that for each s ∈ Sk and each formula ψ we have
‖(Bψ)≥s‖M,w = 1 ⇔ ‖Bψ‖M,w ≥ s
⇔ inf{‖ψ‖M,v |R(w,v)= 1} ≥ s
⇔ ∀v ∈W such that R(w,v)= 1 : ‖ψ‖M,v ≥ s
⇔ ∀v ∈W such that R(w,v)= 1 : ‖ψ≥s‖M,v = 1
⇔ ∀v ∈W such that R(w,v)= 1 : ‖
∨
t≥s
ψt‖M,v = 1
⇔ ‖B(
∨
t≥s
ψt )‖M,w = 1
Hence we obtain
‖αr‖M,w = 1 ⇔ ‖(Bφ)≥r‖M,w = 1 and ‖¬((Bφ)≥r+)‖M,w = 1
⇔ ‖B(
∨
t≥r
φt )‖M,w = 1 and ‖¬(B(
∨
t≥r+
φt ))‖ = 1
⇔ ‖B(
∨
t≥r
φt )∧ ¬B(
∨
t≥r+
φt )‖M,w = 1
By the induction hypothesis it follows that there exists (αr)′ ∈ L′B such that ‖αr‖M,w = ‖(αr)′‖M,w . 
8 Note that for Boolean formulas, ⊕, ∨ and the classical disjunction coincide. The same result holds for ⊗, ∧ and the classical conjunction.
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